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Abstract
On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal formed under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea issued its decision on the proceeding brought by the Philippines against China
relating to certain activities in the South China Sea. The Tribunal’s decision was hotly anticipated as it
deals with various important issues relating to law of the sea and the interpretation of the Convention. It
dealt with issues including the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, legal status of maritime features, historic
rights and duty to preserve the marine environment. Although it remains to be seen whether States will
follow the Tribunal’s precedent, questions arose on whether such precedent can be applied to other
unresolved issues in other parts of the world. This article looks at the application of the precedent
established by the South China Sea arbitration to the situation involving Dokdo between Korea and
Japan.

On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal formed under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 issued its decision on the proceeding brought
by the Philippines against China relating to certain activities in the South China Sea. 2 The
award deals with various important issues relating to law of the sea and the interpretation of
UNCLOS, such as the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, legal status of maritime features, historic
rights, and duty to preserve the marine environment. The impact of the award is felt
worldwide, as it would undoubtedly influence other unresolved issues in other parts of the
world involving islands and maritime features. This is the case particularly in East Asia,
where the Republic of Korea’s (Korea) occupation of Dokdo is challenged by Japan.
Like China and the Philippines, both Korea and Japan are parties to UNCLOS.3 Like
China, South Korea on 18 April 2006 also made a declaration under paragraph 1 of Article
298 to exclude the issue of maritime boundary delimitation and military activities in the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under
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section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS.4 Despite of the fact that UNCLOS does not deal with any
dispute regarding territorial sovereignty, and despite of China’s declaration to exclude
maritime delimitation from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism of UNCLOS, the
Philippines managed to bring China in front of an arbitral tribunal and successfully obtained
a ruling that some of China’s occupation and activities in the South China Sea are unlawful.
Thus, can one party unilaterally bring a case under Part XV of UNCLOS on the issue of
occupation and activities in Dokdo? This article will discuss the relevance of the award on
the arbitration case between the Philippines and China, and its relevance to the issue between
Japan and Korea regarding Dokdo.
I. THE ARBITRATION CASE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND CHINA
The arbitration case against the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China) was brought
by the Government of the Philippines on 22 January 2013, challenging China’s maritime
claims in the South China Sea. 5 The case was brought under the compulsory dispute
settlement mechanism under UNCLOS, to which both the Philippines and China are parties.6
In addition to challenging the legality of China’s maritime claims, the Philippines questions
whether some features in the South China Sea are entitled to generate an EEZ even though
they are so small that it is almost impossible for these features to be inhabited.7
Both China and the Philippines claim sovereignty over most of the Spratly Islands in
the South China Sea. UNCLOS, however, does not prescribe any procedure for the
determination of sovereignty and instead only sets out what maritime zones may be claimed
from land territory (including islands), as well as the rights and jurisdiction of States in such
maritime zones.8 In its Statement of Claim, the Philippines astutely avoids the question of
sovereignty and argues that no matter who has sovereignty over the features in the South
China Sea, there are still legal questions on whether some of those features are entitled to
generate an EEZ and continental shelf.9
When the arbitration case was initiated, China asserted that the tribunal was formed
without any legitimacy and thus did not join the proceeding to formally challenge the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the case.10 China has staunchly snubbed the proceeding and has
4
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refused to participate in any stage of the arbitral process. China’s non-participation, however,
does not prevent the arbitral proceedings from going ahead and the Tribunal from making an
award.11 As the 16 December 2014 deadline set by the Tribunal for China to respond to the
Philippines’ written submission got closer, China seemed to have changed its mind and
decided that it was necessary to make its position known to the Tribunal, in one way or
another. On 7 December 2014, exactly ten days before the deadline, China published a
Position Paper detailing why they believe the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to consider the
case.12
A. The Positions of the Philippines and China on the Arbitration Case
Most of the features that can be considered as “islands” in the Spratly Islands are small,
remote and not capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own.13 Thus,
they are likely to be classified as “rocks”, and would only be entitled to a 12 nautical mile
(M) territorial sea.14 This seems to be the position taken by the Philippines in this case, which
prevents whoever owns the islands from claiming resources beyond 12 M of each “rock”.15
Since most of these “rocks” are located within the 200 M limit of the Philippines’ EEZ
entitlement generated from its main islands, the Philippines argues that the only disputed
waters are the territorial seas surrounding each rock,16 thus leaving a large part of the waters
and the seabed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Philippines does not
recognize the legitimacy of China’s historic claim to the resources in and under the waters
inside the nine-dash line, which is the main basis of China’s maritime claim. 17 The
Philippines also claimed that China has violated its rights under Articles 56 and 77 of
UNCLOS and that there is a dispute between the parties on the interpretation of Article 121
of UNCLOS and on the legality of China’s claim to rights and jurisdiction inside the ninedash line.18
In the Position Paper, China argues that the case involves sovereignty disputes over
land territories, which is not covered by UNCLOS. Even if the Tribunal decided to
distinguish the sovereignty dispute from the maritime dispute, China argues that the maritime
dispute is so intertwined with the issue of maritime delimitation that it is impossible to settle
one without affecting the other.19 Since China has made a declaration to exclude any disputes
concerning maritime delimitation from the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS dispute settlement
11
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in Article 121(1) of UNCLOS. See Notification and Statement of Claim of the Philippines, supra note 5.
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regime,20 China asserted that the tribunal was formed without any legitimacy and thus has
refused to participate in any stage of the arbitral process.21 The Philippines argued that such
disputes are not excluded by China’s declaration because they would not require the tribunal
to delimit the maritime boundary in the area or determine which State has sovereignty over
the islands and other geographic features in the area.22
Although China has made it clear that the Position Paper should not be regarded as
“China’s acceptance of or its participation in the arbitration”,23 it remains the only official
statement of China’s position regarding its objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The
Tribunal, having had no response or argument whatsoever to consider from China, seized
upon the Position Paper and decided to treat it as “constituting a plea concerning the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction”.24
B. The Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal
Since the Tribunal has had formal arguments from both sides – at least on the issue of
jurisdiction – it has decided to conduct a hearing to address the objections to jurisdiction as
set out in China’s Position Paper. 25 On 16 March 2015, the Philippines submitted a
Supplemental Submission to The Hague-based Tribunal. 26 The Supplemental Submission
was in response to the request by the Tribunal for additional argument and information
regarding both the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the merits of the Philippines’ claims challenging
the lawfulness of China’s claims. The Tribunal gave China until 16 June 2015 to comment on
the Philippines’ Supplemental Submission, 27 but the deadline came and went without any
response from China.28
On 29 October 2015, the Tribunal issued its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
in which the Tribunal decided that it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute regarding the
interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS in relation to the status of Scarborough Shoal,
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef as “islands” or “rocks”, as well as the
status of Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, and McKennan Reef
as low tide elevations. 29 The Tribunal also found that it has jurisdiction to consider the
disputes concerning China’s alleged interference with the traditional fishing activities of the
Philippine nationals within the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal, the protection and
20
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preservation of the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, as
well as China’s law enforcement activities in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal. 30 The
Tribunal, however, decided to reserve the decision on its jurisdiction with respect of the rest
of the Philippines’ submissions, including the issue of maritime entitlement in the South
China Sea, to be considered with the merits of the case.31
The Tribunal issued its decision on the merits of the case on 12 July 2016. The
decision gave an almost sweeping victory to the Philippines, where the Tribunal declared that
China cannot use its nine-dash line 32 to claim any rights over maritime resources or any
entitlement to maritime zones.33 The Tribunal also declares that none of the maritime features
in the Spratly Islands are capable in generating EEZ or continental shelf, effectively
categorizing all maritime features there as a “rock” under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. 34
Based on these findings, the Tribunal then concluded that China’s activities on and around
certain features in the Spratly Islands were in detriment of Philippines’ rights and not
consistent with UNCLOS.35 These activities will be discussed in more details below.
II. RELEVANCE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DECISION TO THE DOKDO
SITUATION
Dokdo (Takeshima) is an island consisting of two islets, Dongdo and Seodo, located almost
halfway between Korea and Japan in the East Sea (Sea of Japan). 36 It has a total area of 56
acres and is about 100-174 metres high. 37 The island has been under continuous Korea’s
administration since 1952,38 but this is challenged by Japan.39 The issue of Dokdo continues
to be a source of tension and a thorn on the bilateral relationship between Korea and Japan.
At one point in 1954, Japan even asked Korea to refer the dispute to the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), which was rejected by Korea.40 Korea does not see any reason why it should
bring a matter concerning a territory that it exerts effective control over and that it consider to
legally belonging to it to the ICJ.41 Without Korea’s consent, there is no chance that Japan
could challenge Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo at the ICJ or other international tribunal.
However, the award of the arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea dispute created a
precedent on how a State can unilaterally bring another State to a third party adjudication.
A. Sovereignty Issue
30

Ibid., at para. 408 and 410.
Ibid., at para. 398-412.
32
The nine-dash line was drawn in 1947 by the then Chinese Nationalist Government and was first published in
February 1948. Originally, the map showed the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and
the Spratly Islands as being “part” of China with the use of an eleven-dashed line. The two-dashed line in the
Gulf of Tonkin was deleted in 1953 with the approval of the then Premier Zhou Enlai. See LI Jinming and LI
Dexia, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note” (2003) 34 Ocean Development
& International Law 287 at 290.
33
Award on the Merits, supra note 2, at 473.
34
Ibid., at 474.
35
Ibid., at 475.
36
HYUN Dae-song, “The Dokdo-Takeshima Issue: Its Origins and the Current Situation”, in HYUN Dae-song,
ed., The Historical Perceptions of Korea and Japan (South Korea: NANAM Publishing House, 2008) 37, at 37.
37
Ibid.
38
LI Jin-mieung, Dokdo: A Korean Island Rediscovered (South Korea: Northeast Asian History Foundation,
2010), at 9. See also ibid., at 38.
39
Hyun, supra note 36, at 38-9.
40
Ibid., at 77.
41
Li, supra note 38, at 11.
31
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On the South China Sea dispute, UNCLOS is clear that it does not deal with any dispute
regarding territorial sovereignty. Despite of this, the Philippines managed to successfully
obtain a ruling that China’s occupation of Mischief Reef are unlawful.42 Since the Tribunal
accepted that it has jurisdiction to hear the issue regarding China’s occupation of Mischief
Reef, questions have been raised on whether such strategy can be deployed to other
unresolved issues in other parts of the world involving islands and maritime features,
especially Dokdo.
As was the case with the South China Sea arbitration, any challenges to the
sovereignty over Dokdo cannot be resolved by UNCLOS. So can similar strategy used in the
South China Sea dispute be used in Dokdo situation? For example, can Japan unilaterally
bring South Korea to arbitration to challenge the latter’s occupation of Dokdo? The short
answer is no. The issue regarding “occupation” relates to sovereignty, which as mentioned
above is not under the purview of UNCLOS.
So how could the Arbitral Tribunal that was formed under UNCLOS in the South
China Sea case ruled on the occupation of Mischief Reef? This relates to another claim
brought by the Philippines in the case, which argued that Mischief Reef is not an island or
rock, but a low tide elevation. The status of Mischief Reef is important in determining
whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the occupation challenge. If Mischief Reef is
deemed as an island – or even a rock for that matter – it is subject to sovereignty claim, and
thus the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to hear any challenges on its occupation. 43
However, in its decision the Tribunal found that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation and not
a rock or island entitled to any maritime zones.44 The consequence of this finding is that
Mischief Reef is incapable of appropriation, by occupation or otherwise. Instead, jurisdiction
over Mischief Reef lies on the coastal State in whose EEZ or continental shelf those features
are located. In this case, the Tribunal ruled that Mischief Reef is located within Philippines’
EEZ, and thus it is under the jurisdiction of the Philippines.45
The situation regarding Dokdo Island is different from Mischief Reef. Dokdo is a
naturally formed land that is above water at high tide, which qualifies it as an island or at
least a rock under Article 121 of UNCLOS. Neither Japan nor Korea ever challenged the
status of Dokdo as a high tide feature that can be claimed under international law. Since
Dokdo is subject to sovereignty claim, the sovereignty of Dokdo is not an issue under the
purview of UNCLOS. Thus, Korea cannot be forced to go to the ICJ or other international
tribunal to justify the legality of its occupation of Dokdo.
B. Status of Dokdo as a Rock or an Island
The Arbitral Tribunal’s determination in the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines
and China included a long-awaited articulation of the distinction between “islands” capable
of generating extended maritime claims (that is, EEZ and continental shelf entitlements) and
“rocks” which can only generate a 12 M territorial sea. The decision set a high bar for a
feature to constitute a “fully-fledged” island capable of generating the full suite of maritime
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zones.46 In particular, the Tribunal determined that there are no islands in the Spratly group in
the South China Sea capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf. 47 Extension of this
logic to Dokdo would likely lead to a conclusion that Dokdo is a rock, which only entitled to
a 12 M territorial sea.
The question is whether the Award in the South China Sea dispute will endure and be
influential in future judicial determinations or whether State practice will evolve in a way that
is inconsistent with the decision. The decision may either have diminishing influence on
future cases as time goes on, or it might be treated as an authoritative ruling that will have
enduring effect. If State practice supports the decision then the better legal view is that
Dokdo would be treated as a rock. Yet will a future court take a broader view of “rock” for
features which are close to the mainland? Coastal States typically favor maximizing their
maritime jurisdiction by claiming full entitlement for even extremely small, remote, and
unpopulated islands. This raised the prospect of State practice being unaffected by the
Award.
Whether State practice would follow the jurisprudence of the Award, the South China
Sea Arbitration is now the starting point of discussion regarding whether a feature is a rock or
island. The legal status of Dokdo may or may not be a dispute between Korea and Japan.
Nevertheless, the approach in the Award, when applied, would seem to lead to a conclusion
that Dokdo is a rock.
C. The Delimitation Issue
In the South China Sea arbitration, China argued that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction because
the disputes submitted by the Philippines “would constitute an integral part of maritime
delimitation between the two countries”. 48 Although UNCLOS does contain provisions
concerning the delimitation of maritime boundaries, China’s declaration under Article 298
excluded the issue of maritime boundary delimitation from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.49 This
is a point that the Philippines were aware of, which was why it did not asked the Tribunal to
delimit any maritime boundary between the Parties.50 In its decision, the Tribunal made it
clear that it will only address the Philippines’ claims “only insofar as the two Parties’
respective rights and obligations are not dependent on any maritime boundary or where no
delimitation of a boundary would be necessary because the application of the Convention
would not lead to any overlap of the two Parties’ respective entitlements”.51
Similarly, South Korea made a declaration under Article 298 to exclude any disputes
relating to maritime delimitation and military activities in the EEZ from the compulsory
46

The Tribunal found that “[t]he term ‘human habitation’ should be understood to involve the inhabitation of
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Merits, supra note 2, at para. 542-3.
47
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49
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applicability of Part XV, Section 2, under Article 298 of UNCLOS, see UN, “Settlement of Disputes
Mechanism” UN (20 June 2017), online: UN
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50
Notification and Statement of Claim of the Philippines, supra note 5, at para. 40.
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Award on the Merits, supra note 2, at para. 6.
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dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS. Hence, any issue regarding maritime
delimitation around Dokdo between the two countries cannot be brought under the
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS. However, it is important to note
that the characterization of Dokdo as a rock or island will have consequences for Korea’s
claim of maritime jurisdiction around Dokdo, and the effect of Dokdo in any maritime
delimitation with Japan. Given Dokdo’s location in the central part of the East Sea (Sea of
Japan), its influence in determining the EEZ/continental shelf boundary delimitation between
Korea and Japan is significant. Past jurisprudence on maritime delimitation cases and state
practice suggest that a modified equidistance line, potentially including an enclaving or semienclaving treatment of Dokdo, is a plausible final outcome.
D. Fishing Activities Around Dokdo
One of the claims brought by the Philippines was that China has interfered with the
Philippines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction to exploit the fisheries resources in its EEZ by
enacting and enforcing “laws and regulations that purport to extend China’s law enforcement
jurisdiction, including over fishing resources, throughout the entire area encompassed by the
nine-dash line”. 52 As part of its Article 298 Declaration, China has excluded any law
enforcement activities relating to fisheries in its EEZ from the compulsory dispute settlement
mechanism. However, the Tribunal found that China has no EEZ entitlement around the
Spratly Islands, leaving no overlap with the Philippines’ EEZ. Hence, China’s law
enforcement activities within the Philippines’ EEZ are not excluded from the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal.
The situation with Dokdo is slightly different from the South China Sea. Korea never
claims EEZ generated from Dokdo. Despite of this, there is an overlap of entitlement
between EEZ generated from Korean Peninsula and the EEZ generated from Japan’s
archipelago. Although no EEZ boundaries have been agreed on the area, both countries have
reached an agreement on fisheries that theoretically gives both parties equal fishing rights in
the area, except within 12 M of Dokdo.53 Thus, unless Korea is enforcing its laws in the area
designated to Japan based on the agreement, there is no way to challenge Korea’s law
enforcement activities in its own EEZ as this has been excluded by Korea’s Article 298
Declaration.
The problem however, is less about fishing enforcement in the EEZ of Korea, and
more about the possibility of Japanese fishermen fishing in the sea within 12 M of Dokdo –
which had happened in the past.54 Article 298 excludes law enforcement activities regarding
fisheries in the EEZ, but not in the territorial sea. In theory, any law enforcement issues
within the 12 M territorial sea is subject to the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism of
UNCLOS. However, in the Dokdo situation, any issue relating to the territorial sea of Dokdo
depends on the sovereignty issue over the island, which is not under the purview of
UNCLOS. Hence, any court or tribunals formed under UNCLOS would not have jurisdiction
to decide on the matter.
E. Preservation of the Marine Environment

52

Ibid., at para. 686.
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54
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53
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Even if Japan cannot challenge the occupation of Dokdo to the dispute settlement mechanism
under UNCLOS, can Japan challenge South Korean activities in the waters surrounding
Dokdo? The short answer is yes. However, further examination of the kind of activities that
can be challenged is needed. China – as well as South Korea – has made a declaration
excluding any issue regarding military activities from the compulsory jurisdiction of
UNCLOS. In the Mischief Reef situation, however, China has repeatedly stated that the
construction is not military in nature. Thus, such construction activities are not excluded from
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
China’s massive construction projects raise serious concerns about their effects on the
marine environment. China claims that the ecological environment of the South China Sea
has not been damaged, and that the construction projects on the islands and reefs followed a
high standard of environmental protection, taking into full consideration the protection of
ecological environment and fishing resources. 55 The Philippines slammed this assertion,
stating that China’s ongoing reclamation activities “are causing irreversible and widespread
damage to the biodiversity and ecological balance to waters”.56
This seems to be a valid argument raised by the Philippines. Since three of the
features on which China is undertaking reclamation works in the South China Sea are either
just inside or just outside the limit of the EEZ claimed by the Philippines, it is reasonable for
the Philippines to argue that China has the obligation to notify the Philippines about its
reclamation plans, to assess the environmental impact of the reclamation projects and to share
the result of such assessment with the Philippines. 57 Moreover, since the reefs being
reclaimed by China are either being disputed or located in the middle of an area that is being
disputed, China cannot take unilateral action that would permanently change the status quo of
these reefs.58
Having established jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered the effect on the marine
environment of China’s large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands in
the Spratly Islands and found that China has breached its obligation under Article 192 of
UNLCOS to protect and preserve the marine environment. 59 The Tribunal considers that
given the scale and impact of the island-building activities, China was required to prepare an
environmental impact assessment (EIA) and to communicate the results of the assessment.60
The Tribunal found that China's failure to communicate the results of the EIAs that it had
allegedly conducted with the Tribunal, Meeting of States Parties to the UNCLOS, or any
other international organization, as breach of the obligation of co-operation enshrined under
Article 206 of UNCLOS. 61
55

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua
Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 9, 2015”, online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
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56
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—DFA”, 13 April 2015, online: GMA News Online
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57
See Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v.
Singapore), Provisional Measures [2003] ITLOS, Order of 8 October 2003.
58
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The duty to protect and preserve the marine environment is contained in Part XII of
UNCLOS, which is applicable to all States with respect to the marine environment in all
maritime areas, both inside the national jurisdiction of States and beyond it. In the East Sea
(Sea of Japan) context, as a State party of UNCLOS, Korea is bound by the provisions of Part
XII, and has a duty to protect and preserve the marine environment, not only in the waters
surrounding Dokdo, but in all maritime areas. In conducting activities in the waters around
Dokdo, Korea must ensure that such activities would not harm the marine environment.
Following the Award, Korea should also aware that before conducting any activities around
Dokdo that may affect the marine environment, Korea not only has to conduct an EIA, but
also required to share the result of such assessment, including to Japan. If Korea fails to
observe such obligation, it would be in violation of UNCLOS, and other State parties of
UNCLOS – including Japan – could bring a claim against Korea regarding such violation.
However, if such activities are military in nature, due to Korea’s declaration, they would be
excluded from the jurisdiction of the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under
UNCLOS.
III. CONCLUSION
The issues regarding Dokdo between Korea and Japan are mainly related to Korea’s
sovereignty over Dokdo which is challenged by Japan, as well as the effect Dokdo on
maritime delimitation between the two countries. If international judicial dispute settlement is
sought on both issues at the same time, the case could take a long time to be completed.
Nevertheless, the determination of sovereignty over Dokdo without the logical second phase
of delimitation of maritime boundary is unlikely to resolve the issue between Korea and
Japan. It is unlikely, however, that the issues of sovereignty over Dokdo and maritime
delimitation between Korea and Japan will be brought in front of an international judicial
dispute settlement body without the consent of both parties. Dispute settlement mechanism
under UNCLOS also would not be able to hear the disputes, not only because the issue
sovereignty is outside of the scope of the Convention, but also because Korea and Japan have
both expressly excluded maritime delimitation from the application of the dispute settlement
mechanism under UNCLOS. Following this, since no international court or tribunal could
resolve the sovereignty issue of Dokdo, any issue regarding fishing activities within 12 M of
Dokdo also would not be able to be resolved, as this would depend on the determination of
which country has sovereignty over Dokdo.
However, the Arbitral Award in the case between the Philippines and China raises
concern about the broad jurisdiction being assumed by arbitral tribunals – as well as by the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) – something that might lead Korea to
engagement in a judicial case “by accident”. For example, action on the part of the Korea in
the waters around Dokdo, for instance the construction of an ocean research station
proximate to Dokdo as has been contemplated in recent years, could conceivably leave Korea
open to involvement in a case brought by Japan under the dispute resolution mechanisms
provided for under UNCLOS. This is because such activities on the part of Korea could be
construed as matters directly related to the interpretation of aspects of UNCLOS, especially
the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment under Article 192 and the duty
to cooperate under Article 206. These questions would therefore not be covered by the
exclusions set out in Article 298 of UNLCOS which Korea invoked in its Declaration of 18
April 2006. While any such challenge could not address the question of sovereignty over
Dokdo, such a development may be unwelcome from a Korean perspective, for instance
10

potentially leading to a judicial pronouncement not only concerning the lawfulness of
activities undertaken by Korea and whether such actions constitute an aggravation of the
dispute, but also concerning the status of Dokdo as an island or rock.
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